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Abstract 
It is well proven that communication enhances cooperation in public goods and common-
pool resource experiments. It is less well understood why and how communication affects 
cooperative behavior and whether that impact is mediated by the sharing of a common 
context and the individuals’ every day experiences. This paper aims to close this gap by 
means of a systematic content analysis of communication transcripts from field 
experiments. The paper analyzes communication statements shared by participants in a 
series of common-pool resource experiments conducted in rural Colombia. We first 
classified each statement under two categories: topic and function. Then, we tested 
hypotheses about the impact of those statements on cooperation depending on (1) their 
reference to the “field context” and other topic categories; and (2) the “informational”,  
“disapproval”, or “group solidarity” function of the statements. According to our results, 
statements that contain references to the context affect cooperation depending on the 
function of those statements. When the statements fulfill an information role, the effect is 
negative, but when statements have the function of enhancing group solidarity, the effect is 
positive. The statements that have the strongest positive impact on cooperation are those 
fulfilling a disapproval function, particularly when the topic of the messages are the payoffs 
obtained by the group.  
 
Key words: CPR experiments; field experiments; communication; content analysis; 
collective action 
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1. Introduction 
 
Social dilemmas are situations where individual selfishness is at odds with group interests. 
In the environmental field, social dilemmas have been traditionally associated to the 
extraction of common pool resources like water, forests and fisheries, and the provision of 
public goods such as infrastructure, soil conservation or water quality (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
Empirical studies have shown that local communities all over the world are able to 
communicate as a way of better managing shared resources and provide public goods 
without external enforcers (Agrawal 2014; Agrawal 2001; Andersson 2004; Baland and 
Platteau 1996; Ostrom 1990; Ostrom et al. 1992, 1994; Tucker 2010; Wade 1988). The role 
of communication in non-cooperative social dilemma experiments has been tested in 
numerous laboratory experiments in a variety of disciplines (for meta-analyses see Balliet 
2010 and Sally 1995; for an overview of initial findings see Ostrom et al. 1994). 
Communication has shown to increase cooperation in social dilemmas experiments as it 
increase the ability of individuals in a group to coordinate their actions to restrain their 
appropriation and maintain group extraction levels relatively low. This is not trivial, given 
the benefits that defect ( i.e., free ride on) offers (Ostrom 2006).  
 
Despite the importance attributed to communication in social dilemma games, few studies 
have systematically analyzed the content of communication interactions (Bornstein 1992; 
Ostrom and Walker 1991; Ostrom et al. 1992; Pavitt 2011, Schwartz-Shea and Simmons 
1991) and tested hypotheses about the role of communication in non-cooperative games 
(Orbell et al. 1988; Pavitt 2011; Pavitt et al. 2005; Simon and Gorgura 2003). A few studies 
have used content analysis systematically; however, none has done it with data from 
experiments done in the field with real users of natural resources. Some of the most cited 
hypotheses about why communication works refer to the provision and sharing of 
information, the role of social norms, and the emergence of group identity and solidarity 
(Bornstein 1992; Shankar and Pavitt 2002). Experimental studies have tested the validity 
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of each of the hypotheses separately, with mixed results. Despite the efforts, there is still no 
evidence supporting either the dominance of one hypothesis over others, nor the 
compatibility between several of them (Cardenas and Ostrom 2004).  
 
As in experiments in the laboratory, in field experiments there is evidence of the 
effectiveness of communication in promoting cooperation, but the levels of cooperation 
vary greatly across groups. Studies have shown how the effects of communication can vary 
depending on group dynamics and socioeconomic characteristics of participants (Cardenas 
2003). Other studies have also demonstrated that when communication is allowed there is 
a positive impact on equity, measured with game earnings (Ghate et al. 2013).  Overall, it is 
assumed that doing experiments in the field increases the external validity of the findings, 
because experiments are conducted with samples that are more representative of society 
and real-world context (List and Metcalfe 2014; Poteete et al. 2010).  Scholars have shown 
that context is crucial to comprehend why institutions that manage natural resources may 
function in one scenario but fail in another one (Dietz and Henry 2008; Ostrom 2007; 
Ostrom et al. 2007; Poteete et al. 2010). In this paper we aim to explore the impact of 
context as embedded in the communication interactions within the field experiment as a 
mean to explain users’ behavior during the experiment. 
 
To our knowledge there are not studies investigating how the communication process of 
experiments conducted in the field are influenced by the participants’ context. To fill this 
gap, we content-analyze communication transcripts from framed field experiments 
conducted in rural Colombia. The research questions are “To what extent are hypotheses  
explaining the role of communication in laboratory experiments applicable to the field? Are 
any of those hypotheses more robust than the others in the field setting?   And, to what 
extent does the context permeate the communication interactions?”  
 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the theory and hypotheses 
driving the paper; section 3 addresses the methodology, including a description of the field 
experiments and an explanation of the content analysis and coding procedures; in section 
5 
 
 
 
4, we present the results of the study; section 5 compromises the discussion of the results 
presented in section 4; and in section 6, we conclude and suggest areas for further 
research.  
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
 
Since the 1950s, more than 100 studies have found significant evidence to conclude that 
communication significantly increases cooperation in non-cooperative games. Two 
quantitative meta-analyses have synthesized the literature about the different conditions 
that mediate the impact of communication on cooperation in social dilemmas (Sally 1995 
and Balliet 2010). Sally (1995) found that communication had an effect on cooperation 
after controlling for 23 different experimental conditions. According to the author, the 
frequency of discussion periods and the ability of participants to make promises 
significantly increased cooperation. In a similar meta-analysis, Balliet (2010) found that 
face-to-face discussion enhanced cooperation more than written messages. In addition, the 
author found that repeated communication during iterated dilemmas did not have a 
statistically larger impact than one-shot, pre-play communication.  
 
Cardenas and Ostrom’s (2004) “information layers” framework explains that in many social 
dilemma games, players search for information to create an internalized vision of the game, 
which may involve a set of payoffs that go beyond the formal/external game created and 
described by the experimenter. The internal-game values are then affected by three layers 
of information, to wit: the information players gather about the game conditions and 
dynamics (“material payoffs layer”), the information collected about other players’ 
characteristics and the context in which the experiment is conducted (“group-context 
layer”), and their own values (“identity layer”) (see Figure 1).  Information and 
understanding about the material payoffs and dynamics of the game can emerge through 
trial and error, along a repeated interactions game, through verbal and visual 
communications, or through a combination of them. Similarly, understandings of other 
players’ characteristics and sharing the context may also require some form of 
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communication.  Finally, mobilizing one’s beliefs does not require communicating with 
anyone. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1 and further explained in the paragraphs that follow, the provision 
and information sharing, social norms, group identity and solidarity and the importance of 
the context hypotheses tested in this study can be framed within the “material payoffs” and 
“group-context” information layers of Cardenas and Ostrom’s (2004) framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cardenas and Ostrom 2004 
 
Figure 1: Information levels framework 
 
According to the group identity and solidarity hypothesis, communication contributes to 
the emergence and/or reinforcement of sympathy and shared interests among individuals 
in a group, which in turn facilitates cooperative behavior (Sally 2001). This hypothesis is 
based on our capacity to recognize, anticipate, and sympathize with each other’s 
characteristics, feelings and thoughts, depending on how similar those characteristics are 
to ours. Such sympathy or social identity can increase with the proportion of shared 
attitudes and/or experiences and can modify our willingness to act strategically (Sally 
2001). We depersonalize others and see them as typical members of a group (Turner et al. 
1987). To the extent that others are categorized as members of our group, a motivational 
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shift would occur, and group welfare would matter more than individual welfare (Bicchieri 
2002). 
 
Orbell et al.’s (1988) well-known findings about the within-group cooperation bias have 
been interpreted as evidence supporting the “group identity” hypothesis. Similarly, in a 
game where two groups were competing for the provision of a public good, Bornstein and 
Rapoport (1988) and Bornstein et al. (1989) found that within-group communication 
fostered more intragroup cooperation than between-group communication. Pavitt (2011) 
argues that group identity plays an important role in the first stages of the communicative 
act because it allows for a reason to cooperate in the first place, allowing the emergence of 
trust among decision makers. In the same line, Simon and Gorgura (2003) found that 
solidarity words within the group had a statistically positive effect on cooperation. 
  
According to the above explanations, the group identity and solidarity explanation would 
be fulfilled though statements enhancing the feeling of belonging to a group among the 
individuals  (Bornstein and Rapoport 1988; Bornstein et al. 1989; Orbell et al. 1988; Pavitt 
2011; Sally 2001; Simon and Gorgura 2003). In this regard, our first hypothesis states the 
following:  
 
H1: Statements that enhance group membership among the participants will result in 
lower group extraction levels.  
 
According to provision and sharing of information hypothesis, communication can help 
participants understand the dynamics of the game as well as filling uncertainty gaps about 
the behavior of other players, which in turn increases cooperative behavior (Bornstein 
1992).  
 
Despite the intuitiveness of the hypothesis, empirical results are mixed. Kerr and Kaufman-
Gilliland (1994) found that receiving comments from earlier game players or overhearing a 
discussion from an earlier game did not increase cooperation over a non-communication 
condition. Alternatively, Bochet and Putterman (2009) showed that allowing participants 
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to make unidirectional and nonbinding pre-play announcements about their intended 
behavior has a strong effect on cooperation. Dawes et al. (1977) and Bouas and Komorita 
(1996) found that discussions about irrelevant topics do not facilitate cooperation as much 
as discussions about the social dilemma at hand. Chen and Komorita (1994) showed that 
while non-binding voluntary pledge messages did not improve cooperation over a non-
communication case, minimum agreements did improve cooperation, partially due to the 
extra information that the mechanism provided to the players about other players’ pledges.  
In this regard, we propose our second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Statements providing information about the social dilemma of the game or 
participants’ behaviors will result in lower group extraction levels. 
 
According to social norms hypothesis, communication can act as a form of sanctioning by 
bringing preexisting beliefs about what is socially appropriate in the game (Bicchieri 2002; 
Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994). Sanctions, whether occurring through fines or social 
shunning, counterbalance the individual benefits from uncooperative behavior and thus 
reduce the incentives to free ride (Gächter and Fehr 1999; Lopez et al. 2012; Masclet et al. 
2003; Ostrom et al. 1994; Rege and Telle 2004). Sanctions require the existence of rules 
and/or norms that prescribe a particular course of action. One such social norm is the 
existence of a commitment norm according to which one should carry out those actions one 
has promised to perform, i.e. one’s decisions and actions should be consistent (Kerr and 
Kaufman-Gilliland 1994). Another prevalent social norm in democratic societies is the 
golden rule or ethic of reciprocity that “one should treat others as one would like others to 
treat oneself” (Etzioni 1996). Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland (1994) found that whenever 
communication triggered commitments to cooperate, the impact of such commitments on 
effective cooperation did not depend on the perceived self-efficacy of players, which 
pointed to the existence of social norms that played a role in addition to the payoffs of the 
game.  
  
To the extent that much of the social control that accompanies social norms can be 
transmitted verbally through reproaching, our third hypothesis states the following:  
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H3: Reproach statements about participants’ behaviors will result in a decrease in 
group extraction levels. 
 
One of the values of conducting framed field experiments is the fact that participants are 
more diverse than in laboratory experiments (Cardenas 2011; Henrich et al. 2010) and are 
confronted in the game with situations similar to those of their own context in their 
interactions with people and resources (Harrisson and List 2004; List and Metcalfe 2014; 
Poteete et al. 2010).  A number of studies have used field experiments to explore the 
importance of context on cooperative behavior (see Torres-Guevara and  Schlüter 2016 for 
a summary). Rustagi et al. (2010) measured conditional cooperation through experiments 
and compared it with results on forest conditions in 49 forest user groups in Ethiopia. The 
authors found that groups with more conditional cooperators had more productive forests, 
and these groups were also more likely to invest in forest patrols and thus to sanction free 
riders.  Gelcich et al. (2013) conducted experiments with unionized and nonunionized 
fishermen in Chile. Their results show that unionized fishermen were more cooperative 
than the nonunionized ones.  Among the unionized fishermen they found that fishermen 
from high-performance unions were more cooperative than fishermen from low-
performance unions.  Other authors have found that there is no relation between people’s 
context and their behaviors in the experiment. Hill and Gurven (2004) conducted social 
dilemma games with the Ache tribe in Paraguay, an indigenous community that 
traditionally shares food.  Their results show that the cooperative behavior in their daily 
lives did not translate into cooperative behavior in the experiment. In another study done 
by Gurven and Winking (2008) with another indigenous group, the Tsiname tribe from 
Bolivia, found the same results.  
 
Overall, the relationship between previous shared experiences and cooperation can be 
positive or negative depending on the cooperative experiences shared by the communities 
(Cardenas 2003; Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004; Ghate et al. 2013). It is less clear, however, 
whether the way such shared background is mobilized in communication interactions also 
affects cooperation. In this regard, our last hypothesis states the following: 
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H4: Comments referring to the participants’ context will affect group extraction levels. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
This study uses data obtained from a series of framed field experiments conducted with 
forest users in rural Colombia1 (Cardenas 2000, 2003). Eight participants were invited to 
participate in a common-pool resource game (CPR), recreating a situation in which a group 
of forest users must decide how much to extract from a shared forest (Cardenas 2000, 
2003). The model used by Cardenas follows the one by Ostrom et al. (1994) capturing the 
increasing individual benefits from extracting the CPR, but decreasing costs caused by the 
negative externalities from the extraction of the other group members. The experiments 
were conducted in rural areas of Colombia with direct users of natural resources, 
extracting forest products such as firewood, timber, and hunting as main economic 
activities.  
 
The experimental design included two sets of rounds. In the first set, participants faced 7 to 
10 rounds of an “open access” regime, where participants were not allowed to 
communicate and no regulations were in place. During these rounds participants did not 
have any way to share information, to create agreements or to have non verbal 
communication since they were facing each others backs.  In the second set of 7–10 rounds, 
participants were allowed to communicate with other group members for five minutes 
between rounds before making their decisions. During the communication process, 
participants were allowed to talk freely about any topic, but they were not allowed to 
change the rules of the game, threaten participants, or promise cash transfers after the 
game. The experiment was conducted with paper and pencil, and the communication 
process was tape-recorded and/or video-recorded with the authorization of participants.  
                                                 
1 These experiments were conducted by Juan Camilo Cardenas. For more details on the experimental design and 
procedures, refer to Cardenas 2000. The first author transcribed all available information from the communication 
groups, and both authors did all the work related to the content analysis.  
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There are very few studies that systematically analyze the content of communication 
interactions in non-cooperative game experiments (Orbell et al. 1988; Pavitt et al. 2005, 
2006, 2007, 2009; Simon and Gorgura 2003). The work of Charles Pavitt and collaborators 
(2005) is, in our understanding, the most sophisticated work published in that direction so 
far. Following their work we split communication interactions into statements (see section 
3.2) and classified each statement into two sets of categories. The first set sorts the 
statement according to topics, including discussions about the workings of the game, what 
occurred in past rounds, general strategies to be used in subsequent rounds, and more 
specific strategies to be used in subsequent rounds. The second set of categories looks at 
the function of the statements, including informing, proposing, computing, elaborating, 
evaluating, confirming, maintaining group cohesiveness (“positive maintenance”), 
reproaching  (“negative maintenance”), and guiding the discussion (“procedural 
maintenance”). In the content analyses from a common-pool resource (CPR) experiment, 
Pavitt et al. (2005) found that strategy, maintenance, and procedure discussions were 
positively correlated with cooperation, whereas informational discussions had the opposite 
association. Similarly, Pavitt (2011) found that discussions of specific strategy, 
maintenance, and procedure were positively related to cooperation, while general strategy 
discussion, basic information exchange, and recapitulation of past experiences were 
negatively related to cooperation.  
 
3.1 The Field Experiments 
 
The experiments were conducted with a total of 120 individuals, half of whom were 
women.  A total of 15 groups were included in the analysis of this study. Participants were 
seated in such a way that they were not able to see other participants’ decision forms in 
order to keep their decisions private. Before the start of the experiment, instructions were 
read aloud by the monitor. During the rounds when communication was permitted, 
participants turned their chairs to face the other participants during the five minutes of the 
communication period. At the end of the stipulated time, participants were asked to return 
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to their original positions to make their individual decisions, this process was repeated 
each time communication occurred.   
 
Annex 1 includes the pay-off table containing the individual net gains during the 
experiment. Each participant individually and anonymously had to choose the number of 
months—“My months in the forest”—she/he wanted to spend extracting forest resources 
(columns 0–8). After the eight participants made and wrote their simultaneous extraction 
decisions, a monitor collected all the decision cards and added the individual decisions to 
announce in public the total amount of months the group spent in the forest (individual 
extractions were not announced). With that information, each participant was able to 
calculate “Their months in the forest’’ (the difference between what was announced by the 
monitor and ‘‘My months in the forest’’); then, with that number (rows 0–56), each 
participant also was able to calculate his/her own earnings in that round. The economic 
model behind the pay-off table stands that the group optimum is reached when each 
individual spends one month extracting resources from the forest. On the other hand, the 
Nash equilibrium is achieved if every individual spends six months collecting resources 
from the forest. Cooperation in the experiment implies extracting units close to the group 
optimum, whereas free riding is achieved by extracting units close to the Nash equilibrium.   
 
3.2 Content Analysis 
 
In this section, we present a description of the transcription, unitizing, and coding steps 
involved in the systematic content analysis of communication interactions. 
3.2.1 Transcript preparation and unitizing 
 
The familiarity of one of us with the language and idioms used by participants was crucial 
at the transcription stage, as many of the expressions recorded were very specific to the 
field context. Additionally, the transcripts were checked for accuracy with members of the 
field team that had conducted the experiments whenever necessary. Although it was 
possible to assign statements to different speakers, it was not possible to identify the 
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speaker’s identity, attributes or player number, neither to track the speakers throughout 
game. Thus we do not have an analysis at the individual level, only at the group level.  
 
“Dividing communication transcripts into units is a necessary first step in analyzing them 
by content analysis methods. Furthermore, the reliability of content-analysis studies 
depends not only on reliable rules for categorizing units but also on reliable rules for 
designating these units” (Auld and White 1956, p.1). The ensemble of communication 
transcripts from each experimental group constituted our context units; within each 
context unit, the pieces of text referring to each of the discussions in a round constituted 
our sampling units; and the statements within each sampling unit constituted our coding 
units 2.  A statement (sentence) contains a subject (explicitly or implicitly stated) and a 
predicate (a verb with or without complements or adverbs). Although simpler structures 
can also express statements (e.g., everything is fine), sentences are the most common 
structures used for that purpose and particularly amenable for systematic coding (Auld and 
White 1956. Not all sentences within a communication interaction may constitute valid 
units for coding. To identify valid sentences within the sampling units we followed Auld 
and White’s (1956) criteria3.   
3.2.2 Coding 
 
The coding process included two stages. In the first stage we tested the reliability of Auld 
and White’s (1956) unitizing strategy, and assessed the applicability of Pavitt et al.’s (2005) 
coding scheme. We randomly selected transcripts from three groups and both authors 
coded them together. Both the unitizing and coding processes involved continuous 
                                                 
2 Krippendorff (2004:101) distinguishes between context, sampling, and coding units. Context units are “the units of 
textual matter that set limits on the information to be considered in the description of recording units.” Sampling 
units constitute the units of analysis that are to be compared in terms of coded units. Coding units are the ultimate 
expressions that are identified in the sampling units and coded into categories. 
3 Auld and White (1956) add to basic syntax rules some considerations about semantics. They take into 
consideration that statements are interrupted, recommenced, shortened, or repeated along a conversation to 
discriminate between statements that have with a self-standing meaning and thus are worthy of coding vs. other 
statements and expressions. We found their criteria very useful for the study. Additionally, we paid attention to 
semantics to refine syntax rules about dependent versus independent statements as we understood that some 
dependent statements can be separated as self-standing units of meaning. The ultimate unitizing scheme used in this 
study is available upon request to the authors. 
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exchange of opinions and interpretations, which helped us refine the unitizing and coding 
schemes. In the process, we adapted Pavitt et al.’s (2005) coding scheme. First, we created 
a “field context” topic category to capture the potentially distinctive communication topic 
of discussions in field experiments and test the last hypothesis of this study. The category 
included statements about the natural resource use and management context of 
participants. Second, we did not include Pavitt et al ’s (2005) topic categories of 
computation, elaboration, and confirmation or the procedural function category due to lack 
of data and concerns raised about their relevance. Alternatively, we created new sub-
categories of topic, including “collective action” vs. “free rider,”  “wrong interpretation,” and 
“group results” vs. “individual results” to accommodate data that did not fit in Pavitt et al.’s 
(2005) scheme (see Tables 1.a and 1.b). Once the transcripts were coded, we entered the 
data into a content analysis software (N-Vivo 8.0) and ran queries of each category to 
revise the consistency of all the text quotations within each category. 
 
Table 1.a: Topic categories in coding book 
Category Name Description 
1.  Game dynamics  
1.1 Collective actiona Statements describing the dilemma between individual 
appropriation and group gains 
1.2 Free ridinga Statements describing the situation in which an individual 
can earn high rents at the expense of the cooperative 
behavior of other individuals 
1.3 Wrong interpretationa Statements pointing to game dynamics that do not 
correspond to the workings of the experimental game  
2.  Past results and actions   
2.1 Group past resultsa  Statements about what the group or individuals other than 
the speaker did in past rounds of the experiment 
2.2 Individual past resultsa Statements about what the speaker did in past rounds of the 
experiment 
3.  Collective strategy  
3.1 General collective strategy Statements pointing to a general group strategy to be used in 
subsequent rounds of the experiment 
3.2 Specific collective strategy Statements pointing to a specific group strategy (i.e. including 
specific numbers) to be used in subsequent rounds of the 
experiment 
4.  Individualistic strategy Statements pointing to strategies wherein each participant 
decides what to do independently from other participants’ 
decisions   
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Category Name Description 
5.  Field context Statements pointing to the connections between the game 
and a common background of real-life situations (this 
includes references to both  real people or natural resources)  
6.  Game rules Statements about the rules that specify how decisions and 
computations are to be made in the experimental game 
7.  Off topic Statements that do not fit in any of the preceding categories 
a Sub-category added to original scheme 
Source: Coding created by authors based on Pavitt et al. (2005).   
 
 
Table 1.b: Function categories in coding book  
Category Name Description 
1. Informationb Statements providing descriptions or non-normative opinions, as well as 
potential acknowledgments following those statements 
2. Proposal  Statements suggesting a strategy to be followed in the subsequent rounds of 
the experiment 
3. Evaluation Statements providing judgments and normative opinions, as well as 
acknowledgments following those statements 
4. Positive maintenance Statements showing appreciation, interest, affiliation, or social support for 
the opinions and/or actions of other group members 
5. Negative maintenance Statements of disapproval or criticism of the group or other players, as well 
as expressions of nonconformity, disinterest, displeasure, or frustration with 
the opinions and/or behaviors of other players. This category is similar to 
the “evaluation” category because it involves judgment; additionally this 
category includes a “reproaching” component that is not present in the 
“evaluation” category.  
6. Off function Statements that do not fit in any of the preceding categories 
Source: Coding created by authors based on Pavitt et al. (2005) 
b All statements are informative per se; however, some statements go beyond and use that information with a 
purpose other than just providing information. The information function refers to statements that are purely 
informative and do not involve any other functions. 
 
 
In the second stage of the coding process, each author individually unitized and coded one-
half of the transcripts. Additionally, at the end of the coding process, to check for intercoder 
reliability, both authors coded the communication transcripts of three randomly selected 
groups. Then, we conducted a Guetzkow’s (1950) U test and a Kappa coefficient test (Sim 
and Wright 2005) to compare the unitizing and coding results, respectively.  The overall 
reliability of both the unitizing and the coding across the three groups ranged from fair to 
very high (see Annex 2 for a more detailed explanation).  
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In sum, each hypothesis requires observing different topic categories, function categories, 
and interactions between topic and function categories, and their correlation with group 
extraction levels. To test Hypothesis 1 we observed Positive maintenance statements. 
Theory is not very informative about the kind of themes (Bornstein and Rapoport 1988; 
Bornstein et al. 1989; Orbell et al. 1988; Pavitt 2011; Sally 2001; Simon and Gorgura 2003) 
that would be prone to the effect of Positive maintenance on cooperation so we used the 
whole set of those statements without discriminating between topics covered. To test 
Hypothesis 2 we observed statements that (1) fulfilled an Information function and (2) 
uncovered topics that had been associated to the provision of information, i.e., Collective 
action, Past results and actions of others, and Past results and actions of oneself (Bochet 
and Putterman, 2009; Dawes et al., 1977; Bouas and Komorita, 1996; Chen and Komorita, 
1994). By the same token, to test Hypothesis 3 we looked at statements with a Negative 
maintenance function that covered Past results and actions of others, and Past results and 
actions of oneself (Bicchieri 2002; Kerr and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994). Finally we tested 
hypothesis 4 by observing Field Context statements, i.e., uncovering connections between 
the experiment and a common background among the players. Just like with Hypothesis 1, 
theory is not very informative about the function that would make such statements 
particularly effective (or effective at all) in promoting cooperation so we observed the set 
of those statements as a whole.  
Table 1.c presents a summary of all categories used to test the hypotheses, including 
intersections created between topic and function categories. Annex 3 shows examples of 
type of statements mentioned by participants for each one of the hypotheses.  
 
Table 1.c: Categories used to test hypotheses 
Hypothesis Interacting categories Variable Group 
extraction 
 Topic Function   
H1   Positive maintenance positive  
H2 Collective action Information  collinfo  
Past results and actions of others  Information pastothersinfo 
Past results and actions of oneself  Information pastowninfo 
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H3 Past results and actions of others  Negative maintenance pastothersnegative  
Past results and actions of oneself Negative maintenance pastownegative  
H4 Field context    
 
4. Results 
 
We started the analysis by comparing group extraction differences before and after 
communication for each group. Table 2 shows that extraction levels decreased notably 
when communication was permitted in all but two groups (the differences between the 
rounds with no communication and the rounds with communication were not statistically 
significant). The decrease was statistically significant in 8 of the remaining 13 groups. This 
result is quite interesting because previous scholarship in laboratory economic 
experiments has shown that communication would generally increase cooperation among 
participants; however, as also noted in other studies on field experiments, the effects of 
communication can vary from one group to another (Ghate et al. 2013).  
 
Table 2: Group mean extraction levels before and during communication rounds 
 Group mean extraction level  
Group 
In rounds before 
communication 
In rounds with 
communication t test 
1  36.1 (8.3) 33.3 (3.3) 0.5156 
2   29.3 (5.0) 23.1 (5.5) 0.0016 
3  31.4 (6.5) 28.7 (3) 0.3242 
4  38.5 (5.2) 28.5 (5.9) 0.0001 
5   38.1 (6.6) 39.4 (5.4) 0.7771 
6  37.7 (7.4) 31.1 (9.6) 0.1011    
7  37.1 (9.7) 22.5 (5.1) 0.0155   
8 38.8 (6.2) 31.6 (9.9) 0.0035   
9   30.1 (6.1) 34.8 (9.9) 0.2142 
10   38.8 (9.9) 30.3 (5.1) 0.0628 
11   35 (5.6) 29.5 (7.1) 0.0245 
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 Group mean extraction level  
Group 
In rounds before 
communication 
In rounds with 
communication t test 
12   40.6 (3.3) 20.1 (6.2) 0.0000 
13  26.9 (7) 25.8 (5) 0.6062 
14  28.1 (8.4) 8.8 (4.8) 0.0004   
15  26.5 (4.8) 21.4 (15.3) 0.5594 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. Paired t test presented.  
 
 
Table 3 presents the intersection of the two coding categories, to wit, the frequencies of the 
topic and function categories. In the topic category, most of the statements were Off Topic, 
followed by statements about Group Past Results and Individual Past Results, whereas in 
the topic category, most of the statements were about Information, Proposal, and 
Evaluation. Most of the statements on Field Context were Information and Proposal 
categories. The intersections between Information and Individual Past Results, Information 
and Group Past Results, Proposal and Specific Collective Strategy, and Information and 
Collective Action are the intersections categories where we found most of the statements. 
Other intersections that seem to be prominent are Negative Maintenance and Group Past 
Results, Evaluation and Individual Past Result, Proposal and General Strategy, Evaluation 
and Group Past Results.  Finally, 359 out of 1,493 statements coded were classified as Off 
Topic.  The fact that participants discuss functions that may not seem relevant for the game 
may be a characteristic of experiments in the field.   
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Table 3: Intersection of frequencies of topic and function categories in all groups and rounds 
   Function 
Topic 1. Information 2. Proposal  3. Evaluation 
4. Positive 
maintenance 
5. Negative 
maintenance 
6. Off 
function 
 
Total 
1.1 Collective action 101 0 10 3 0 1 115 
1.2 Free ride 9 0 1 1 3 0 14 
1.3 Wrong interpretation 43 1 3 0 1 0 48 
2.1 Group past results  114 0 69 12 93 0 288 
2.2 Individual past results 121 0 81 0 16 0 218 
3.1 General C. strategy 11 79 3 25 4 0 122 
3.2 Specific C. strategy 18 112 9 27 3 0 169 
4. Individualistic strategy 7 13 0 2 8 1 31 
5. Field context 45 28 6 6 13 2 100 
6. Game rules 8 0 1 1 3 2 15 
7. Off topic 190 7 42 12 20 88 359 
Total 669 240 228 89 173 94 1,493 
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Table 4 shows correlation coefficients between the average group extraction levels in all 
rounds where communication was allowed and the different coding categories. The topic 
categories having a negative and significant relationship with group extraction levels are 
Collective Action (i.e. statements describing the dilemma between individual appropriation 
and group gains), Group Past Results (i.e. statements about what the group did in past 
rounds), Specific Collective Strategy (i.e. statements about the specific strategies that 
players should follow in subsequent rounds). 
 
The negative correlation between statements about past results and actions and extraction 
levels should be taken with caution, since it is only when the statements address the 
group’s past results and not the speaker´s results that communication has a significant 
relationship with group extraction level. Similarly, the relationship between statements 
about collective strategies and group extraction levels should be assessed carefully since it 
is only when those statements address specific strategies (i.e. saying “we should extract 1 
or 2” rather than “we should extract less”) that communication has a significant 
relationship with group extraction levels. 
 
Among the function categories, only Negative Maintenance (i.e. statements of disapproval 
or criticism) has a negative and significant effect on group extractions. Through 
disapproval, participants would be reinforcing the correct action, i.e. extracting fewer units 
from the CPR. In some sense these negative maintenance statements are calls for the group 
or individuals to change the way they are behaving. The rest of the table gives some 
statistical support to the information already presented in Table 3. 
 
The results just presented would fail to support arguments about the positive role of group 
membership (our Hypothesis 1) to enhance cooperation, and the fact that the field context 
may be influencing the results if the game (our Hypothesis 4).  These results would tend to 
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support that information sharing and reproaching have a positive impact in people’s 
cooperative behaviors (our Hypotheses 2 and 3).  
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Table 4: Correlation coefficients between average group extraction level and coding categories 
 Category 
Group 
extraction 1. Information 2. Proposal  3. Evaluation 
4. Positive 
maintenance 
5. Negative 
maintenance 
1.1 Collective action -0.20** 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.28*** 0.20** -0.01 
1.2 Free riding 0.09 -0.01 0.25*** 0.17* 0.16* 0.05 
1.3 Wrong interpretation -0.03 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.11 0.16 -0.14 
2.1 Group past results -0.19** 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.11 0.70*** 
2.2 Individual past results  -0.03 0.29*** 0.18** 0.30*** 0.24** 0.37*** 
3.1 General collective strategy  -0.02 0.34*** 0.71*** 0.28*** 0.52*** 0 
3.2 Specific collective strategy -0.21** 0.22** 0.88*** 0.14 0.44*** 0.08 
4. Individualistic strategy -0.13 -0.02 0.22** -0.04 0.18* 0.29*** 
5.Field context 0.12 0.36*** 0.13 0.13 0 0.01 
6. Games rules -0.09 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.28 0.09 
1. Information 0.03 
     
2. Proposal  -0.12 
     
3. Evaluation 0.12 
     
4. Positive maintenance -0.07 
     
5. Negative maintenance -0.26*** 
     
Significance levels: *** = 0.0; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
Note: Off Topic and Off Function categories have been excluded due to lack of meaningful interpretation. 
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To further analyze our data, we developed a series of three OLS models.  The dependent 
variable in all models is group extraction level, and the unit of analysis in all models is the 
decision round. The regressions include only the rounds with communication, but in all 
models we control for the average extraction level of that particular group in the rounds 
where communication was not permitted.  Additionally, in all models we include the 
variable round to account for the fact that the decision setting had different rounds and 
potential learning effects.   
 
In the first model, presented in Table 5, we include a selection of topic categories that are 
relevant to test our hypotheses (see Table 1.c).  The model confirms some of the findings of 
the correlation analysis. The Collective Action variable has a negative effect on group 
extraction levels (10% significance level), meaning that groups discussing the dilemma 
between individual and collective extraction extract fewer units and thus cooperate more 
in the experiment.  The Field Context variable does not have an effect on extraction levels, 
which fails to support Hypothesis 4. Also, the impact of the Specific Collective Strategy 
variable is significant and negative (5% significance level) whereas the effect of the General 
Collective Strategy variable is significant and positive (10% significance level). According 
to this, the level of specificity in collective strategies makes a big difference in the levels of 
cooperation, with general strategies causing more harm than good and specific statements 
improving cooperation. Finally, the statements about Group Past Results notably decrease 
group extraction levels (5% significance level), while statements on Individual Past Results 
have no effect on cooperation. One possible interpretation of this last result is that 
discussing how the group performed in past rounds may be more efficient and relevant for 
the group in terms of information sharing than letting each participant share his/her 
actions and results but not connecting them to the results of the group. 
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Table 5: OLS Coefficients for topic categories  
  Group extractions  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant (group extraction) 31.16*** 5.83 
Collective action -1.03* 0.53 
Field context 0.41 0.33 
General collective strategy 0.88* 0.48 
Specific collective strategy  -0.65** 0.30 
Group past results -0.80** 0.32 
Individual past results 0.64 0.45 
Round -0.12 0.36 
Mean rounds first set of rounds (no 
communication) 
0.30 0.21 
Adj. R2 = 0.158 
    
 Significance levels: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
 
 
In a second OLS model, found in Table 6, we regressed group extractions on the function 
categories. Almost none of the variables had a significant impact on group extraction levels. 
The impact of the Information and Proposal variables were not significant, meaning that 
the exchange of any piece information does not necessarily explain extraction levels. 
Positive Maintenance statements had no effect on group extraction levels either (i.e. 
statements showing appreciation or interest for other group members’ opinions or actions 
did not enhance cooperation). This result fails to support our first hypothesis, which 
posited a positive relationship between positive maintenance statements and cooperation. 
Only the Negative Maintenance category (i.e. statements of disapproval or criticism for the 
group or other players) had a significant, and negative, effect on extraction levels (5% 
significance level). This latter result supports Hypothesis 3.  
 
Table 6: OLS coefficients for function categories  
  Group extractions  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant (group extraction) 15.08 9.11 
Information 0.07 0.20 
Proposal -0.28 0.27 
Evaluation 0.57 0.50 
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  Group extractions  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Positive maintenance 0.03 0.79 
Negative maintenance -0.68** 0.27 
Round 0.23 0.40 
Mean rounds first set of rounds (no 
communication) 
0.27 0.27 
Adj. R2 = 0.118     
Note: Significance levels: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
 
In our last model, presented in Table 7, we include different interactions between topic and 
function categories as a more accurate test of our hypotheses. The model encompasses all 
relevant variables to test the hypotheses (see Table 1.c)4 . 
 
Table 7: OLS Coefficients for topic-function categories 
  Group extractions 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
Constant (group extraction) 15.80* 8.82 
Positive maintenance 0.18 0.74 
Colectinfo -1.08** 0.483 
Pastotherinfo 0.324 0.623 
Pastowninfo -0.557 0.58 
Psothersnegative -1.22* 0.63 
Psownnegative 0.76 2.39 
Fieldinfo 1.13* 0.60 
Fieldpositive -3.32* 1.73 
Round  -0.01 0.37 
Mean rounds first set of rounds (no communication) 0.406* 0.206 
Adj. R2 = 0.12 
  
Significance levels: *** = 0.01; ** = 0.05; * = 0.1 
Note: The asterisks in the variables below denote the intersection between these two variables.   
Colectinfo = Collective Action * Information; Pastothersinfo, = Group Past Results * Information; 
Pastowninfo= Individual Past Results * Information; Psothersnegative= Group Past Results * Negative 
Maintenance; Psownnegative= Individual Past Results * Negative Maintenance; Fieldinfo =Field Context* 
Information; Fieldpositive= Field Context *Positive Maintenance  
 
                                                 
4 After a first trial including the Field Context variable alone (which had a positive but not significant effect), we 
carried a step-wise exploration of the effect of interactions between Field Context and Positive maintenance and 
Field Context and Information.  
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As shown in Table 7, the coefficient for Positive Maintenance is not statistically significant, 
meaning that statements affirming group membership alone do not have an impact on 
group extraction.  Once again, these results do not support Hypothesis 1.  
 
We find that the coefficient of Colectinfo (interaction of Collective Action* Information 
statements) is negative and significant at 5% meaning that statements that help 
participants understand the social dilemma of the game result in an increase of 
cooperation. This result supports Hypothesis 2 and the argument about the contribution of 
communication to cooperation through information sharing. Alternatively, neither 
Pastotherinfo (Group Past Results * Information) nor Pastowninfo (Individual Past Results * 
Information) have a significant effect on group extraction levels, which fails to support the 
same hypothesis. These results help to further refine our previous observation about the 
lack of impact of any piece of information on cooperation. Sharing information about the 
behavior and payoffs of the players in a social dilemma does not have any effect on 
cooperation, but the provision of information about the dynamics of the game and the 
collective-action dilemma that it entails does. 
 
The coefficient of Psothersnegative (Group Past Results * Negative Maintenance) is negative 
and significant at 5%, but the effect of Psownnegative (Individual Past Results * Negative 
Maintenance) is not significant. This result qualifies our previous findings about Hypothesis 
3 and the argument about the contribution of communication to cooperation through social 
norms. The negative impact of Psothersnegative and the lack of impact of the Pastotherinfo 
suggest that the effect of statements about results and actions performed by the group 
depends on the reproach vs. information function of those statements, where the first one 
has an impact on cooperation and the latter does not. 
 
The Fieldinfo (Field Context*Information) variable is positive and statistically significant at 
10% level, indicating that when individuals bring their own experiences from real life into 
the experiment in an informative way, group extractions increase. Alternatively, the 
Fieldpositive (Field Context * Positive Maintenance) variable is negative and statistically 
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significant at 10%. The number of observations behind this variable is quite low (6), so the 
result has to be taken with caution. Overall, these findings supports our Hypothesis 4, 
suggesting that when statements about the context are used to show appreciation, interest, 
affiliation, or social support for other group members, cooperation increases. More 
importantly, the impact of a common background among individuals sharing a social 
dilemma can have a positive as well as negative impact on cooperation levels depending on 
the intention of those who mobilize that common background (e.g. to increase social 
cohesion vs. inform, or maybe other functions), and also the experiences the users have 
sharing their resources.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
According to our analysis, we did not find an impact coming from positive maintenance 
statements as a whole (hypothesis 1); however, we found a positive impact from the subset 
of statements that refer to positive maintenance and the field context of participants 
(Fieldpositive). These results qualify previous works about the positive effect of group 
identity and sympathy on cooperation (Bornstein et al. 1989; Orbell et al. 1988; Sally 2001) 
and suggest that such an effect may be facilitated when participants can mobilize shared 
experiences. More broadly, the results qualify previous findings about the positive impact 
of material rewards vs. punishments in experimental contexts (Rand et al. 2009). Further 
research will explore the extent to which verbal punishments and rewards compare to each 
other. 
 
Results about the impact of information sharing are mixed (hypothesis 2). Although 
informative statements about the collective-action dilemma can enhance cooperation, 
informative statements about what the group or individuals did in past rounds have no 
impact on cooperation. This result suggests that exchanging information to reach a 
common understanding of a situation may have very different implications in terms of 
collective action than exchanging information just for the sake of updating individuals’ 
strategic behaviors. Recognizing the difference between the two processes can actually 
help understand contradictory findings in previous studies about the impact of information 
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on cooperation (see particularly Bouas and Komorita 1996; Chen and Komorita 1994; Kerr 
and Kaufman-Gilliland 1994; Pavitt 2011). Confirming whether that distinction and the 
more general discrimination between different types of information make a difference in 
terms of cooperation in social dilemmas justifies further research. 
 
Also, importantly, the impact of statements about past results and actions can change 
depending on the information vs. reproach function of those statements. This finding 
constitutes an important piece of evidence supporting the social norms argument against 
the information argument. More broadly, the result illustrates the importance of 
distinguishing between topic and function of statements (Pavitt et al. 2005) and the 
interest of further exploring their interactions to better understand how communication 
can contribute to cooperation. 
 
When participants talk about their individual past decisions and payoffs, cooperation does 
not change; however, when participants focus on the decisions and payoffs of other 
individuals or the group as a whole, cooperation tends to increase. This finding can be 
interpreted with regard to communication efficiency. Discussing how the group performed 
in past rounds may be more efficient in terms of information sharing than letting each 
participant share his/her actions and results one at a time. Further research might explore 
the role of efficiency in communication and its impact on cooperation.  
 
We found that statements on specific strategies can increase cooperation and statements 
on strategies that are not specific enough can actually decrease cooperation. This result 
qualifies Bochet and Putterman’s (2009) finding about the positive effects of pre-play 
announcements, and aligns with Chen and Komorita’s (1994) finding on the positive effect 
of minimum-binding pledges vs. non-binding messages. Additionally, the finding suggests 
that the line separating the positive from the negative impact of communication on 
cooperation is a fine one and that previously unstudied qualities of communication such as 
the level of specificity can make a difference. 
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The results clearly support the social norms argument (Bicchieri 2002; Kerr and Kauffman-
Gilliland 1994; Kerr et al. 1997) over the group identity and information argument (Bouas 
and Komorita 1996; Brosig et al. 2003; Chen and Komorita 1994; Dawes et al. 1977). The 
impact of negative maintenance statements (i.e. statements of disapproval or criticism of 
the group or other players) is robust across all the models we developed (hypothesis 3). 
This result becomes particularly evident when negative maintenance statements refer to 
the past behavior and payoffs of the group.  
 
According to our analysis, the field context permeates the communication process in many 
ways, with subsequent consequences in the game (hypothesis 4). We found that statements 
about the field context can have a positive impact on cooperation if those statements aim to 
enhance group cohesion. But if statements are only informative then cooperation 
decreases. This result extends the findings in Ghate et al. (2013) and Cardenas  (2003) 
suggesting that the effectiveness of communication in the field depends not only on the 
common background participants bring to the game but also the way participants report 
about those experiences (i.e, the function of their communication statements). Overall, our 
findings regarding the field context show the need to do more research on this 
communicative aspect. Field experiments are a promising way to do so, when they are 
combined with a content analysis of the communication processes.     
 
The function categories were not as explanatory as we had anticipated. This may mean that 
for field experiments we need to tailor the function categories to the specific ways affairs  
discussed by participants in field settings.  
 
There are several limitations of this study that need to be mentioned. First, there are some 
limitations in the quality of the data. When the experiments were conducted, the 
researcher was not aiming to explore the content of discussions; therefore, the 
transcriptions of the discussions did not allow for identifying each person speaking and 
prevented the study of discussions at the individual level and/or the emergence and role of 
discussion leaders. In the same line of statements, we know that many of the participants 
intervened in the discussions, but we cannot say how many of them and/or how frequently 
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they did.  However, methodologically, this study shows that a systematic content analysis 
can be a step further in the use of experiments to better understand why communication 
can contribute to cooperation. Improved coding schemes and collection of communication 
data, particularly in field experiments, will facilitate synergies between content analysis 
and experimental methods. More reliable coding schemes and communication data might 
in turn encourage experimentalists to take into account the possibility of studying not only 
the outcomes of participants’ decisions but also the rationale and dynamics behind some of 
those decisions when participants have the opportunity to communicate.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
  
We wanted to understand the mechanisms by which communication has an impact on 
cooperation, with a particular focus on the role of field context. For that purpose, we 
content-analyzed data from field experiments and did a series of OLS models explaining 
cooperation.  
 
Three main theoretical conclusions can be extracted from the analysis. First, our results  
show evidence supporting the social norms argument over the information and group 
identity arguments about the relationship between communication and cooperation. 
Statements promoting group cohesiveness had no effect on cooperation except when 
referring to the common context and/or experiences of participants. Similarly, the impact 
of information statements depended on whether those statements addressed the social 
dilemma (improvement of cooperation) or focused on past results and actions of the 
participants (no effect). On the contrary, statements of disapproval, specifically when 
centered on the group’s past results and actions, consistently improved cooperation across 
all the analyses. 
 
The second theoretical conclusion relates to the role of communication in field 
experiments. As pointed out by other scholars, participants can bring different experiences 
from their own context into experiments, with different results depending on the positive 
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or negative nature of those experiences (Cárdenas and Ostrom 2004; Ostrom 2006; Poteete 
et al. 2010). According to our results, the impact of previous experiences and context on 
cooperation can be channeled via communication and in that way may also depend on the 
intention (i.e. function) of communication interactions. Studying the communication 
process in the field is a promising area of study since our results indicate that statements 
related to the field can increase or decrease cooperation. This result clearly shows the 
complexity of field experiments. 
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